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Abstract
We study the relationship between job quality and retirement using panel
data for European countries (SHARE). While previous studies looked at the
impact of bad working conditions on retirement intentions, we can use the panel
dimension to study actual retirement as well as other pathways out of a job.
As indicators for job quality we use three different approaches: overall job sat-
isfaction, over- and undereducation for a particular job as well as effort-reward
imbalance which measures the imbalance between a worker’s effort and the re-
wards he or she receives in turn.
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1 Introduction
Given the ongoing demographic transition caused by decreasing fertility rates and an
increasing life expectancy, the currently high proportion of persons in some form of
retirement in the age group 55–65 observed in most European countries is one of the
major challenges to European policymakers in the 21st century. In order to design
policies that increase the participation rates among those 55 years and older, policy-
makers should be aware of the factors that influence the decision to stop working or
to retire. Past research has shown that macroeconomic and institutional conditions,
such as the incentives created by the pension system have a strong influence on retire-
ment decisions (Gruber and Wise, 1999). Furthermore, the decision to stop working is
influenced by health conditions (Kalwij and Vermeulen, 2008), such as chronic illness
or disability, and job quality. For the study of industrial relations it is particularly
important if also working conditions and job quality are related to retirement decisions
of workers.
First results from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE)
have shown that there is a strong association between poor job quality and poor health
(?), and that both, poor job quality and reduced well-being are positively related to
the intention to retire (Siegrist et al., 2006). Therefore, job quality may have both a
direct and an indirect effect – by affecting health – on the decision to stop working
or to retire. While there have been studies investigating the impact of job quality on
intentions to retire (Siegrist and Wahrendorf, 2009), no studies have looked at actual
retirement yet. Moreover, it has been found that job quality has significant importance
for quit intentions and actual job-to-job changes (Bo¨ckerman and Ilmakunnas, 2009).
In this contribution we use data from the first and the second wave of SHARE
to explore the relationship between job quality and the decision to stop working or
to retire. As job quality is a collective term for various working and employment
conditions, such as the physical work load, the imposed work pressure, the incentive
structure and the perceived job stability, we use three different approaches to measure
it. Our first measure of job quality is an individual’s subjective overall job satisfaction,
which is meant to capture all dimensions of job quality, but is not very operative from
a policy perspective. Therefore, we use two additional measures of job quality that
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should be easier to manipulate and therefore more relevant for policymakers. The first
one is whether an individual is overeducated, undereducated or adequately educated
for the job he or she holds. Tsang et al. (1991) have shown that overeducated male
workers are less satisfied in their job and have a higher intention to leave the firm.1
The second one is derived from the effort-reward imbalance model (Siegrist et al.,
2004) and measures the imbalance between a worker’s effort and the rewards he or she
receives in turn.
2 Data and Empirical Design
We use data from the first two waves of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe (SHARE), a survey focusing on the living conditions of Europeans aged 50
and above. The first wave was conducted in 2004/05 in 11 European countries and
the individuals were re-interviewed in 2006/07.2
Sampling We focus on the population aged 50 to 65 at the time of the first
interview in 10 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.3 From these 14,121 individu-
als, about 48% were working while not receiving any public pension benefits. Since we
are interested in whether the quality of the job has an influence on the employment
decision later on, we dropped all individuals who did not work in the first wave and
who were self-employed, resulting in a data set of 5,639 individuals. Of those persons,
3,712 were interviewed again in the second wave two years later and completed the
questions on their employment status.
Dependent Variables As shown in Figure 1, the majority of the individuals in
our sample is still working at the time of the second interview in 2006/07. Regarding
retirement, the situation is unclear, because a significant amount of persons already
1McGuiness and Wooden (2009) have shown that greater mobility among overskilled workers is
often due to involuntary job separations and even when job separations are voluntary, the majority
of moves do not result in improved skill matches.
2See http://www.share-project.org/ for detailed information on the survey.
3We had to drop Greece from the analysis because some categories in the outcome variable and in
several right-hand-side variables had no observations which would have caused a perfect prediction in
the models. An inclusion of these observations in some of the models (where possible) did not change
the results.
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claim public pension benefits while still being employed (at least partly): we will
classify these persons as ”partly retired”.
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
male
female
working retired partly retired unemployed sick/disabled other
Figure 1: Employment status by gender in 2006/07
17 percent of women and 21 percent of men retired or partly retired between the two
waves. About 5 percent of the female workers left employment due to other reasons,
e.g. to become homemakers (about 80 percent of female workers in this category).
Differences among European countries are highlighted in Figure 2. The share of
individuals who are still working ranges from 77 percent in Switzerland to 64 percent
in Spain. The retirement and partial retirement rates vary substantially between
European countries. In Austria, Italy and Sweden, 20 percent or more switch to
retirement or partial retirement. While most of them are fully retired in Austria
(20 percent), Swedes opt more often for partial retirement (nearly 21 percent). The
Austrian workers seem to give up working immediately when they start receiving
public pension benefits. This phenomenon may be partly explained by differences in
the pension systems and regulations concerning the compatibility of work and claims
for public pension benefits.
We are interested in whether the characteristics of the jobs, individuals held in
2004/05, have an influence on the decision to stop working within the next two years.
We estimate binary and multinomial probit models. In the binary case, our depen-
dent variable is indicating whether a person is still working at the time of the second
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Figure 2: Employment status by country in 2006/07
interview. On average, 16 percent of the individuals stopped working; they retired,
became unemployed, sick or disabled or left employment due to other reasons (e.g. to
become homemakers). The remaining 84 percent are working or are partly retired, i.e.
they are working and receive public pension benefits at the same time.
On the one hand, partly retired individuals contribute to a country’s GDP and
should therefore be counted as working. On the other hand, they receive public pension
benefits involving costs to the welfare state. According to this view, partly retired
individuals should be counted as retired. We investigate both options because the
decision to retire fully or only partly may depend on the characteristics of the last
job. A low job quality may abet full retirement, while a medium quality may result in
partial retirement only.
Our first binary dependent variable working is 1 for individuals who work and 0
for all other categories. The second variable working or partly retired is 1 for all
individuals who work, irrespective of whether they receive any public pension benefits.
This definition, thus, includes partly retired individuals. About 71 percent of the
individuals in our sample are working and 84 percent are working or partly retired.
To analyse in more detail possible transition states of persons who gave up their job
between the two waves, we also apply multinomial probit models. In that case, the
dependent variable consists of six categories: working, retired, partly retired, unem-
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ployed, permanently sick or disabled and other (including homemakers). A description
of the dependent variables and the explanatory variables as well as summary statistics
for the whole sample and for women and men separately are given in Table 1.
Job Quality We use three different sets of variables to measure job quality:
subjective job satisfaction, match quality in terms of education as well as effort and
reward related job characteristics.
At the first interview, the respondents were asked about their overall job satis-
faction: ”All things considered, I am satisfied with my job. – Would you say you
strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?” About 47 percent of the respon-
dents strongly agreed, 46 percent agreed, 6 percent disagreed and about 1.5 percent
strongly disagreed with this statement. For our estimations, we form three categories:
very satisfied, satisfied and not satisfied (including strongly dissatisfied). The distri-
bution of job satisfaction differs somewhat between genders, with women being found
significantly less often in the second category (44 percent vs. 48 percent).
Subjective job satisfaction captures all dimensions of job quality. Since this in-
formation cannot be leveraged by policy makers, we use two further measures of job
quality. We focus on (i) the match quality between the individuals and their jobs and
(ii) the balance between efforts and rewards in the last job. Our measure of match
quality is whether people are adequately educated for the job they hold or whether
they are over- or undereducated. The adequate (required) education level for a job is
approximated by the mean value of education years within country-specific one-digit
occupational groups. Based on these average education levels, we construct binary
variables for over- and undereducation. Being overeducated implies that a person has
undergone more years of education than the mean value (plus one standard deviation)
in the one-digit ISCO group in a country. Accordingly, undereducation is defined as
having more than one standard deviation fewer years of education than the mean in
the corresponding group. This approach is based on the work of Verdugo and Turner-
Verdugo (1989). In total, about 17 percent of all respondents are overeducated and
about 14 percent are undereducated for their job. Male workers are significantly more
likely to be overeducated than their female counterparts (19 percent compared to 15
percent).
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For our third measure of job quality, we use the effort-reward imbalance model,
developed by Siegrist (1996) and recently applied by Siegrist et al. (2004, 2006); ?.
The model claims that jobs are particularly stressful if they are characterized by a
non-reciprocity or imbalance of high efforts made and low rewards received from the
job. An occupational effort-reward imbalance is documented to be related to poor self-
rated health, depression and the desire to retire as early as possible Siegrist (1996).
In the first wave of SHARE, the employed individuals were asked about the efforts
they put into their work and the rewards they finally get. The respondents had to
appraise to what extent they agree with the following statements (strongly agree,
agree, disagree or strongly disagree)4:
• My job is physically demanding. (43)
• I am under a constant time pressure due to heavy workload. (54)
• I receive adequate support in difficult situations. (74)
• I receive the recognition I deserve for my work. (72)
• Considering all my efforts and achievements, my earnings are adequate. (58)
• My job promotion prospects/prospects for job advancement are poor. (68)
• My job security is poor. (22)
The first two items are effort related, while the other five items refer to rewards
people get for their work. Statistically significant gender differences are found for the
items on support, recognition, the adequacy of earnings and job security, with female
workers reporting higher levels on support (76 vs. 72 percent) and recognition (74
vs. 70 percent) and lower levels of adequacy of earnings (54 vs. 63 percent) and job
insecurity (19 vs. 24 percent).
The ERI (effort-reward imbalance) is defined by the ratio of the sum of scores for
efforts to the sum of scores for rewards, adjusted for the number of items and ranges
from 1
4
to 4. Following Siegrist et al. (2006), we use tertiles of the ratio, which we
calculated for each country separately to account for different reporting styles. In our
estimation sample, 37 percent of all female workers and 34 percent of all male workers
4The numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of all individuals who agreed or strongly
agreed to the statements.
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are located in the first tertile (high job quality), 30 percent and 34 percent in the
second tertile and 33 percent and 32 percent in the third tertile, which is associated
with the poorest job quality. In our regressions, we use the tertiles and the specific
items, to document which job characteristics are most relevant for the employment
decision within the next two years.
Table 2 shows the correlation between subjective job satisfaction and the other
job quality indicators. Surprisingly, over- and undereducation are not related to job
satisfaction. For all other measures significant correlation coefficients are obtained.
Regarding the specific job quality items, the correlations are strongest for support
in difficult situations and recognition for work, followed by adequate earnings and job
security. The ERI ratio, as an overall measure of job quality, is also strongly correlated
with job satisfaction. Figure 3 highlights the correlation between job satisfaction and
the ERI ratio by country. Job satisfaction as well as the effort-reward-relation is most
favourable in Switzerland and least favourable in Italy.
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Figure 3: Job Satisfaction and Effort-Reward-Imbalance
The empirical literature on the link between educational/skill mismatches and job
satisfaction is somewhat ambiguous: Tsang et al. (1991) suggest a negative corre-
lation between overeducation and job satisfaction among male workers. Using data
from the European Community Household panel, Vieira (2005) obtains similar results
for a pooled sample of male and female workers. In contrast, Groot and van den
Brink (1999) find no significant correlation between over- or undereducation and job
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satisfaction among older workers. Rubb (2009) shows that there is no relationship
between an educational mismatch and the probability to retire early, although the
literature suggests a link between job dissatisfaction and the intention to retire early
(e.g. Blanchet and Debrand, 2009). Rubb (2009) provides two explanations for the
missing link between an educational mismatch and the probability to retire early: (i)
Since human capital depreciates over time, a “formal” education-job mismatch is not
necessarily accompanied by an actual mismatch between acquired and required skills
(skill mismatch) at later stages of the working life. (ii) At the end of their career,
older workers may voluntarily choose jobs for which they are overskilled. Both expla-
nations suggest that overeducated workers may not be dissatisfied with their job. Allen
and van der Velden (2001) provide evidence that – even among younger workers – an
educational mismatch need not imply a skill mismatch, and show that the skill mis-
match rather than the educational mismatch is negatively related to job satisfaction
of younger workers and lead to a higher probability of on-the-job search.
Econometric Models We use binary and multinomial probit regressions to es-
timate the relationship between job quality and the employment decisions of older
people. The binary model can be written as
Working∗ict+2 = β1 + β2 JQ ict + β3Xict + υc + ict (1)
Working ict+2 =
 1 if Working
∗
ict+2 > 0
0 otherwise
(2)
where Working∗ict+2 is the latent probability of individual i in country c to work
at the time of the second interview t + 2 (two years after the first interview). JQ ict
captures quality indicators of the job people held at the time of the first interview t,
X ict is a vector of control variables and υc are country-specific error terms.
Alternatively, the multinomial probit model can be written as
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Uicat+2 = β1a + β2a JQ ict + β3aXict + νca + icat, (3)
icat ∼ MVN(0,Σ), (4)
Uic1t+2 = 0 (5)
Yict+2 = j ⇔ Uicjt+2 > Uicat+2 ∀ a 6= j, (6)
where Uicat+2 is the utility of individual i in country c of alternative a in time t+ 2.
We investigate six alternatives: working, retired, partly retired, unemployed, sick or
disabled and other. The category working is always the base alternative and its β’s
are set to zero. Therefore, we have five alternative specific β’s to estimate because
the influence of each job quality variable or control variable can be different for each
alternative. Finally we have a set of alternative and country specific error terms νca.
The vector X ict includes individual characteristics (years of education, binary indi-
cators for being married, 10 categories of age, self-perceived health, activity limitations
and subjective life-expectancy), job-related characteristics (civil servant, monthly gross
wage and number of weekly working hours) and variables that account for the het-
erogeneity in pension systems in the different countries (whether early and statutory
retirement is possible based on age, gender and regulations of minimum pension ages
in the countries). Furthermore, we control for country-specific effects. We estimate
the model on the pooled female and male sample and interact all job quality variables
with a female dummy. In the tables below we present marginal effects that use either
male or female workers of a specific base group as reference for the calculation.5 The
effects reported in one row include the base category (working) and add up to zero
within the group of female workers and the group of male workers.
In general, our estimation sample consists of 3,712 observations. However, depend-
ing on the job quality indicators we are using, several observations have to be dropped
because of missing values.6 Furthermore, the information on some control variables,
such as subjective life-expectancy, monthly gross wage and working hours is missing in
5The estimated coefficients of separate estimations for males and females are very similar to the
results presented below.
6We lose 0.24 percent of the observations when focussing on job satisfaction, 2.07 percent for over-
and undereducation and 1.97 percent when effort and reward-based job quality indicators are used.
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some cases. We keep these observations, set the values to zero and control for missing
values with binary indicators in the regressions.
3 Results
The results of our empirical analysis on the relationship between job quality and em-
ployment decisions are shown in Table 3 for the binary probit model and in Table 4 for
the multinomial probit model. All models include the control variables and country
indicators described in section 2.
3.1 Results of the binary model
Table 3 presents results from the binary probit model for the two outcomes working
and working or partly retired and the three different measures of job quality – job
satisfaction (Panel A), match quality with respect to education (Panel B), and the
effort-reward imbalance ratio and its components (Panel C and D). Each panel repre-
sents two separate regressions (one for working and one for working or partly retired
as outcome.) using the pooled sample of male and female workers in each regression.
Panel A Using three categories of job satisfaction as indicators for job quality, we
find a negative correlation between lower levels of overall satisfaction with the job and
the probability of working two years later. Female workers who are not satisfied with
their job are 14.2 percentage points less likely to be employed than females who are
very satisfied with their job. There is no significant difference between females who
are very satisfied and females who are satisfied only. For male workers, the correlation
is somewhat lower. Being satisfied with the job is related to a 5.5 percentage points
lower probability of working compared to being very satisfied. The negative association
is somewhat higher (-9.1 percentage points) for males who are not satisfied at all.
The stronger reaction of females points to a lower attachment to the labor market as
suggested by generally higher labor supply elasticities of female workers compared to
male workers.7
7See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a review of the literature on labor supply. More recent
evidence (e.g. Bishop et al., 2009; Blau and Kahn, 2007; Wernhart and Winter-Ebmer, 2011) shows
that women’s labor supply elasticity with respect to their own wage has decreased substantially since
the early 1980s.
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In the remaining two columns we present estimations results for our second depen-
dent variable working or partly retired. The working population now includes addi-
tionally also individuals who are working and receiving public pension benefits at the
same time. When counting these individuals as working we do not find any significant
association between the employment probability and job quality as measured by job
satisfaction. Since the estimated coefficients on all satisfaction indicators are closer
to zero compared to the model where partly retired individuals are not counted as
working, it seems that dissatisfied female workers are more likely to retire only partly
instead of leaving the labor market entirely.
Panel B Our second set of estimates is based on the match quality between
individuals and their jobs with respect to education as a measure of job quality. We find
no significant relationship between being over- or undereducated and the employment
probability, neither for males nor for females. Only when including partly retired
workers in the working population, we find that overeducated males are less likely to
be employed compared to workers who are adequately educated for the job they hold.
Panel C Results based on the effort-reward imbalance (ERI) ratio are presented
in Panel C of Table 3. The ERI ratio is divided into country-specific tertiles. We
use the first tertile as base group and present the coefficients for the second and third
tertile. The base group includes individuals in high quality jobs, whereas the third
tertile includes individuals in poor quality jobs i.e. individuals who have to make
high efforts but receive low rewards in return. Contrary to expectations from the ERI
model, our estimation results suggest no significant effect of an imbalance between
efforts and rewards on the employment probability, irrespective of whether we include
partly retired workers in the working population or not.
Panel D As there is no direct support for the combination of effort-reward items
according to the ERI model, we concentrate on estimating the effects of the specific
items separately instead of using the ERI ratio. We find a significant negative rela-
tionship between the lack of job security and the employment probability two years
later. The effects are somewhat higher for female workers (-15.4 percentage points)
than for males workers (-11.8 percentage points). Neither of the other items related
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to rewards (support, recognition, pay and prospects) or efforts (physically demanding
job and time pressure) are significantly related to the probability of working.
Using our second dependent variable working or partly retired we find somewhat
higher negative effects of poor job security for both genders, which might imply that
workers who face low job security do not go into partial retirement but rather leave
the labor market entirely. Moreover, female workers are 4.2 percentage points more
likely to be working or partly retired if they stated that they are under a constant time
pressure due to heavy workload, and 7.1 percentage points less likely if their earnings
are adequate with respect to their efforts.
3.2 Results of the multinomial model
The results of the multinomial model are shown in Table 4. Each panel presents
marginal effects in percentage points obtained from one multinomial probit regression
and multiple nonlinear marginal effects calculations. The effects in one line add up to
zero.8
Panel A The self reported job satisfaction measures show less clear results in the
multinomial model than in the binary model. If we split the outcome into six different
categories the precision of the estimates suffers. Nevertheless, we find a strong negative
effect of job dissatisfaction in the first wave on the probability of working two years
later (-14 percentage points). The positive effects on partial retirement, full retirement
and other (esp. being homemaker) confirm, though less significant, the tendency to
reduce working time in these unsatisfying jobs.
Panel B The estimates for our measure of match quality complement the effects
of the binary models above. The results show a significant transition of overeducated
male workers into unemployment (8.1 percentage points) compared to workers with
adequate education (the base group). Undereducated female and male workers also
tend to reduce their labor force participation. Being undereducated tends to increase
the probability of partial and full retirement for female workers (about 4 percentage
points each) and the probability of partial retirement for male workers (6.2 percentage
points), though these results are not significant. Our estimates are consistent with the
8The marginal effects are calculated using the method proposed in Ai and Norton (2003).
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literature on the link between educational mismatches and job satisfaction for older
workers, as described before.
Panel C Compared to the binary model, we do find significant effects of the ERI
ratio in the multinomial model. First of all, the effects for female workers are much
stronger and clearer than those for male workers. Female workers with ERI ratios
in the second and third tertile significantly reduced their labor force participation by
6.3 and 8.2 percentage points compared to female workers in high quality jobs (first
tertile). For the third ERI tertile we find a significant increase in full retirement of 4
percentage points and in sick or disability leave of 1.5 percentage points. The lower the
job quality the more female workers tend to go into partial retirement (4.5 percentage
points for both tertiles, not significant). Furthermore, we find a significant but small
negative effect on the transition into other states (esp. homemakers) for the third
tertile.
The effects of an imbalance between efforts and rewards are less consistent for
male workers. We find a significant reduction of the transition into full retirement
for workers in medium quality jobs (second tertile) compared to workers with high
quality jobs (-1.8 percentage points). These workers seem to work longer than their
colleagues in high quality jobs (3 percentage points, not significant). Workers with poor
quality jobs tend to stop working and tend to have a higher transition probability into
unemployment and other states compared to workers in high quality jobs, although
the coefficients are again not significant.
Panel D Finally, we look at the effects of the effort and reward related job
characteristics that compose the ERI ratio in detail. Consistent with the findings in
the binary model we estimate a significant reduction in labor force participation of 14
and 9.8 percentage points due to poor job security for male and female workers. As
expected, this reduction is reflected in a significant transition out of the labor market,
particularly into unemployment (13.6 and 7.1 percentage points). One hypothesis for
this strong effect is that workers with short-term contracts face poor job security.9
955.6 percent of workers with short-term contracts in the first wave also reported poor job security.
Also 20.2 percent of workers with permanent contracts report job security. So we find a positive – but
not very strong - correlation (0.2344) between poor job security and having a short-term contract.
31.7 percent of the unemployed workers in wave 2 reported a short-term contract in wave 1 while
only 14.2 percent of the unemployed report that they lost their job because of a temporary contract.
This indicates a much broader sense of the poor job security reported by the respondents.
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The effects of the remaining job characteristics differ with respect to gender. Female
workers are responsive to support and recognition at their workplace. Females who get
adequate support in difficult situations are 3.1 percentage points less likely to go into
partial retirement and – though insignificant – 4.5 percentage points more likely to be
employed. When female workers receive adequate recognition, they are 3.6 percentage
points less likely to retire and tend to have higher employment and partial retirement
rates compared to female workers who do not receive recognition for their work. Ad-
equate earnings, on the other hand, seem to reduce labor force participation. Female
workers whose earnings are adequate with respect to their efforts are 5.7 percentage
points more likely to retire. This comes along with reduced labor force participation
and reduced partial retirement, though both insignificant. This counterintuitive result
might be due to heterogeneity with respect to lifetime income (social security wealth),
i.e. workers with higher lifetime income might take the opportunity to retire.
In contrast, male workers seem to be less responsive to effort- and reward-related
job characteristics. Next to job security, only promotion prospects matter for the labor
force participation decision of males. Poor promotion prospects lead to a significant
reduction in labor force participation (-5.7 percentage points) and a significant tran-
sition into partial retirement (4.2 percentage points) compared to workers who have
good career opportunities.
4 Conclusions
We study the relationship between job quality and retirement using panel data for
European countries (SHARE). While previous studies looked at the impact of bad
working conditions on retirement intentions, we can use the panel dimension to study
actual retirement as well as other pathways out of a job. As indicators for job quality
we use three different approaches: overall job satisfaction, over- and undereducation for
a particular job as well as the effort-reward imbalance, which measures the imbalance
between a worker’s effort and the rewards he or she receives in turn.
Our results show that, in particular for females, overall dissatisfaction with a job
leads to a pronounced exit from work, either in full or partial retirement, but also out
of the labor force. More detailed analyses for particular aspects of working conditions
14
show that inadequacies between education and the current job does not predict early
exit from the labor force to a larger extent. A major predictor for early retirement
is the fact, that job security in the current job is especially poor. This can be due
to partly involuntary transitions into early retirement, because of a job loss at a later
stage in life.
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5 Tables
Table 1: Variable Description and Summary Statistics
All Means
Variable Description Mean Stdev Females Males
Binary outcomes
working Individual is working 0.713 0.721 0.706
working or partly retired Individual is working or partly
retired
0.837 0.834 0.840
Multinomial outcomes
working Individual is working, 0.713 0.721 0.706
retired retired, 0.067 0.058 0.076
partly retired retired and gets public pensions, 0.038 0.039 0.037
unemployed unemployed or looking for work, 0.025 0.023 0.027
sick or disabled permanently sick or disabled, 0.123 0.112 0.134
other homemaker or other (rentier,
student etc).
0.033 0.047 0.020
Job quality variables
very satisfied Individual is strongly satisfied
with the job,
0.466 0.482 0.450
satisfied satisfied with the job, 0.461 0.438 0.482
not satisfied dissatisfied or very dissatisfied
with the job.
0.073 0.079 0.068
overeducated More years of education than the
mean value (plus one standard
deviation) in the one-digit ISCO-
group in the country
0.170 0.149 0.189
adequately educated Neither over- nor undereducated 0.692 0.706 0.679
undereducated Fewer years of education than
the mean value (minus one stan-
dard deviation) in the one-digit
ISCO-group in the country
0.138 0.145 0.132
physically demanding Individual (strongly) agrees to
the statement: the job is phys-
ically demanding
0.431 0.444 0.419
time pressure he/she is under time pressure 0.540 0.528 0.551
support he/she receives adequate support 0.740 0.761 0.720
recognition he/she receives recognition 0.718 0.741 0.697
adequate earnings the earnings are adequate 0.583 0.539 0.625
poor prospects the job prospects are poor 0.682 0.687 0.677
poor job security the job security is poor 0.216 0.188 0.242
ERI ratio effort-reward imbalance mea-
sure: efforts divided by rewards
(adjusted for number of items)
0.991 0.437 0.983 0.997
ERI first tertile First tertile of the ERI ratio (in
his/her country)
0.352 0.368 0.338
ERI second tertile Second tertile of the ERI ratio 0.320 0.298 0.340
ERI third tertile Third tertile of the ERI ratio 0.328 0.334 0.322
to be continued . . .
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. . . continued
All Means
Variable Description Mean Stdev Females Males
Control variables
female Individual is female 0.482 1.000 0.000
married Individual is married 0.808 0.769 0.845
age Age in years 55.257 3.733 55.096 55.406
education Years of education 12.840 3.763 12.719 12.953
health excellent Self-rated health is excellent, 0.299 0.304 0.294
health very good very good, 0.510 0.491 0.528
health good good, 0.166 0.182 0.152
health poor fair or poor. 0.025 0.023 0.025
adl Limitations with activities of
daily life
0.030 0.027 0.033
life expectancy Number of additional years the
individual expects to be alive
14.083 5.240 14.489 13.702
civil servant Individual is a civil servant 0.185 0.174 0.195
wage Monthly gross wage 0.271 0.204 0.213 0.326
other pay Wage includes additional pay-
ments (like bonus)
0.217 0.200 0.234
unfolding brackets Income derived through unfold-
ing brackets in interview
0.090 0.097 0.083
hours Number of working hours per
week
33.658 10.299 30.099 36.967
early possible Early retirement possible accord-
ing to age, gender and regula-
tions in the country
0.241 0.246 0.236
statutory possible Statutory retirement possible 0.092 0.095 0.089
m life expectancy Life expectancy missing 0.035 0.032 0.038
m wage Wage missing 0.075 0.063 0.087
m hours Working hours missing 0.022 0.022 0.021
Countries
AUT Austria 0.050 0.044 0.055
BEL Belgium 0.138 0.122 0.154
CHE Switzerland 0.053 0.050 0.056
DNK Denmark 0.107 0.108 0.106
ESP Spain 0.057 0.051 0.061
FRA France 0.125 0.135 0.116
GER Germany 0.105 0.109 0.101
ITA Italy 0.058 0.053 0.062
NLD Netherlands 0.121 0.114 0.127
SWE Sweden 0.187 0.214 0.161
Observations 3,712 1,790 1,922
Notes: The number of observations is smaller for job satisfaction (3,703), for over- and undereducation (3,635) and
for job characteristics (3,639).
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Table 2: Job satisfaction, education and effort-reward-imbalance
Variable Females Males
Correlation of not satisfied & . . .
overeducated 0.009 -0.002
undereducated 0.005 0.013
physically demanding 0.059** 0.085***
time pressure 0.089*** 0.054**
support -0.255*** -0.264***
recognition -0.263*** -0.239***
adequate earnings -0.139*** -0.137***
poor prospects 0.097*** 0.039*
poor job security 0.133*** 0.115***
ERI ratio 0.261*** 0.256***
ERI first tertile -0.153*** -0.131***
ERI second tertile -0.056** -0.039*
ERI third tertile 0.210*** 0.172***
Observations 1,731 1,835
Notes: Correlation coefficients reported, sample of all observations with non-missing in-
formation on all job-quality variables. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the
1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent level.
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Table 3: Binary probit regressions: Job quality
Working Working or partly retired
Variable Females Males Females Males
Panel A (N = 3,703)
base: very satisfied
satisfied -3.286 -5.552 4.672 3.477
( 3.704) ( 3.047)* ( 3.560) ( 2.571)
not satisfied -14.183 -9.124 -3.705 -3.803
( 6.700)** ( 5.534)* ( 6.981) ( 5.337)
Panel B (N = 3,635)
base: adequately educated
overeducated -1.116 -1.732 -6.252 -7.424
( 4.203) ( 5.759) ( 5.607) ( 4.428)*
undereducated -0.725 -4.796 -1.707 3.452
( 3.494) ( 5.063) ( 5.877) ( 3.191)
Panel C (N = 3,639)
base: ERI first tertile
ERI second tertile -4.779 5.811 -0.461 4.926
( 4.496) ( 3.982) ( 3.302) ( 3.018)
ERI third tertile -5.053 -1.198 -0.622 -0.862
( 4.051) ( 4.342) ( 2.916) ( 3.494)
Panel D (N = 3,639)
physically demanding -0.786 4.729 1.047 3.489
( 3.444) ( 3.330) ( 2.642) ( 2.393)
time pressure 1.777 1.867 4.234 3.031
( 3.421) ( 3.431) ( 2.543)* ( 2.505)
support 4.490 3.419 0.279 1.210
( 3.713) ( 3.990) ( 3.070) ( 3.052)
recognition 2.383 -1.881 4.451 -0.798
( 3.878) ( 4.208) ( 2.931) ( 3.132)
adequate earnings -4.368 3.142 -7.141 0.203
( 3.751) ( 3.768) ( 3.337)** ( 2.758)
poor prospects -4.927 -2.628 -2.280 3.551
( 3.940) ( 3.806) ( 2.950) ( 2.666)
poor job security -15.350 -11.843 -18.278 -14.014
( 5.443)*** ( 4.359)*** ( 5.004)*** ( 4.196)***
Notes: Each panel (A–D) in each outcome refers to a separate regression, the female column shows the interaction
effect of the job quality variable with the female dummy, for males the same applies, marginal effects reported, all
control variables and country-indicators included, heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses, weights
account for differences in sampling probabilities, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1-percent,
5-percent and 10-percent level. Control variables as shown in Table 1 are included.
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